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In the abstract, the paper states that “ignoring
intangible investments in the late 1990s leads one
to conclude that productivity growth was modest,
corporate profits were low, and corporate invest-
ment was at moderate levels.”
This gloomy characterization of the (incor-
rectly measured) 1990s does not fit conventional
wisdom and the (incorrect) facts. It may well be
the case that correctly accounting for intangible
investments makes things look better; but, even
without this correction, the late 1990s are per-
ceived as a time of massive investment, fast pro-
ductivity growth, and corporate bonanza.
By 1995-2000, productivity growth had
returned to levels not seen since the late 1960s,
and in high-technology sectors, such as industrial
machinery and electronic machinery, productivity
growth reached astonishing numbers—well over
5 percent per year (see Table 1).
Similarly, investment as a share of gross
domestic product reached record levels, especially
when measured as a ratio of real quantities, as
the rate of decline in the relative price of equip-
ment accelerated during the late 1990s. Finally,
while profits may not have accelerated in tandem
with investment and productivity, capital owners
did extremely well as the effective cost of capital
declined and capital gains increased dramatically.
ON THE MODEL AND 
MEASUREMENT
Here one needs to differentiate between
comments on the many steps to improve the
E
llen McGrattan and Ed Prescott’s article
is right in highlighting an important
fact: “Intangible investment” is large
and likely to vary over time. Unfortu-
nately, standard methods for calculating national
income and product accounts miss the bulk of
this investment. Thus, conclusions about invest-
ment, productivity growth, and corporate sector
performance can be severely distorted.
The authors go on to make a bold claim: They
can measure intangible investment correctly with
the help of a simple theory.
The result of their bold attempt is to change
the “history” of the late 1990s—as, in their pre-
ferred version, productivity growth and other
prosperity indicators look significantly better
than those obtained with conventional national
accounts data.
I like bold statements. They are a useful start-
ing point and they invite reactions. My comments
below start the latter. The current version of the
paper incorporates my main suggestion during
the conference, which was to provide a measure
of the path of intangible investment that does not
depend on verifiable assumptions that are rejected
in the data. This is now their first approach. But
they also chose to keep their previous method in
the paper (now called the second approach) and
much of the wording in the introduction and con-
clusion fits the second approach better than the
first. Thus, I have decided to revisit the comments
I made at the conference.
I had essentially two points: a minor one on
the authors’ characterization of the 1990s and a
more substantive one on their measurement of
intangible capital.
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          accounting of averages and comments on the
dynamics. I have little to say about the former,
except to express admiration for the many useful
and careful steps taken in “amending” conven-
tional national accounts procedures. My concerns
are all about the discussion of dynamics.
On the investment side, the authors assume no
adjustment costs and, hence, a marginal product
of capital equal to the interest rate throughout.
This is not a good model of short-run investment.
Short-run frictions are of the essence in invest-
ment theory, and the corresponding capital gains
can generate large wedges between marginal
product and interest rates. Because several of the
numbers computed in the paper are the result of
ratios of numbers that are very close to zero, it is
easy to generate variations of several hundred
percent in the numbers reported in the paper, just
by allowing for small wedges between marginal
product and interest rates.
On the labor side, there are assumptions of
perfect labor mobility across sectors, Cobb-Douglas
production functions, and so on. Again, while
these may be reasonable assumptions for the
medium and long run, they are inadequate for the
short run. This difficulty is particularly apparent
in their main expression used in the conference
to measure the path of intangible capital in the
corporate sector:
(1)          ,
where x is intangible investment; CCOMP and
NCOMP are labor compensation in the corporate
and noncorporate sectors, respectively; NVA and
CVA are value added in the corporate and non-
corporate sectors, respectively; and θ and α are
the Cobb-Douglas share of labor in the corporate
and noncorporate sectors, respectively. This leads
to Figure 5 in the current version of their paper
(my Figure 1).
This figure produces a dramatic rise in intan-
gible investment at the end of the 1990s and is
the figure that best matches the introduction and
general message of the paper. But how did they
obtain equation (1), and how important are the
assumptions behind this derivation for the results?
The answer to the second part of the question is
“a lot.” Let me follow a slightly different deriva-
tion from theirs, which facilitates understanding
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Table 1
Private Nonfarm Business Productivity Growth
1948-73 1973-79 1979-90 1990-95 1995-2000
Labor productivity 2.9 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.5
Multifactor productivity 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.1
Manufacturing 1.5 –0.6 1.1 1.3 2.1
Industrial machinery 0.7 0.2 3.2 3.1 5.8
Electronic machinery 2.1 1 3 6 7.4
Percent of Trend GDP









Intangible InvestmentFollowing what they now refer to as “the first
approach,” one can obtain an expression for intan-
gible capital from the first-order condition of the
corporate sector, after assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function for actual (as opposed to
measured) value added, and noticing that actual
value added is equal to measured value added plus
intangible capital (erroneously expensed). Then,
(2)                 .
But how do we go from equation (2) to (1)?
Before answering this, note that under a Cobb-
Douglas assumption in the noncorporate sector,
the basic first-order condition for labor implies:
(3)               “1” .
We are now ready to go from (2) to (1), as the
latter is obtained by multiplying the first term on
the right-hand side of (2) by the expression for “1.” 
However, the nice feature of 1 is that we can
do many things with it without affecting the
expression we are multiplying or dividing it by.
In particular, we may chose not to multiply by “1,”
or we can chose to divide the first expression of
the right-hand side of (2) and multiply the second
expression. All of these formulas for intangible
=− () 1 α NVA NCOMP
x CCOMP CVA 1 1 =− − () θ
capital should yield the same result. My Figure 2
shows that they do not.
The dashed line corresponds to my suggestion
at the conference and their current Figure 1; the
solid line corresponds to their Figure 4; and the
remaining line corresponds to the other transfor-
mation. It is apparent from this figure that their
“1” is not really 1. This is confirmed in Figure 3.
In summary, I maintain my recommendation
from the conference. Given that “1” is not really 1,
I would suggest they focus on the measure of
intangible investment that does not use this incor-
rect information. This is the dashed line in my
Figure 2. Of course, in this case the story for the
end of the 1990s is much less dramatic, and it
looks more like a story about the dip of intangible
investment during the mid-1990s rather than a
surge at the end of the 1990s. Where would this
dip come from? There is a good chance that the
implicit “1” in the corporate sector (also Cobb-
Douglas assumption, no frictions, etc.) is not
correct either, in which case it may all be just
“measurement” error.
Having said this, I believe the step taken by
the authors was worth it. It was bold, most likely
not right, but it opens a potentially important
area of research. Somebody will get it right in
the future. The authors will then get the credit
they deserve.
Caballero













Percent of Trend GDP
Figure 2
Intangible Estimates for Different “1”
Operations
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